

Shantai Industries Limited

CIN : L46411GJ1988PLC013255

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Date: 18.08.2025

To,
BSE Limited,
PhirozeJeejeebhoy Towers,
Dalal Street,
Mumbai- 400001
Scrip ID/ Code / ISIN: SHANTAI/512297 /INE408F01024

Dear Sir/Madam,

Sub: Newspaper Publication of Unaudited Financial Results under Regulation 47 of SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 for the Three month ended as on 30th June, 2025.

With respect to the captioned subject, Please find attached herewith copies of newspapers advertisement of Unaudited Financial Results for the Three month ended as on 30th June, 2025, which was published in “Free Press”, English edition and “LokMitra” Gujarati Edition on 15th August, 2025.

Please take the above information on record.

Thanking you.

Yours faithfully
For Shantai Industries Ltd

HARISHBHAI FATANDAS SAWLANI
Managing director
DIN: 00831848
Place: Surat

Andaman Islands: India's strategic frontline in Indo-Pacific



Like a sharpshooter methodically chambering rounds before a high-stakes standoff, India is fortifying its most valuable maritime outpost—the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. As the Quad appeal lessens amid the US downgrade of India as a security partner, New Delhi has emphasised geography. The 572 islands in the Bay of Bengal, long overlooked, are being transformed into what strategists call an unsinkable aircraft carrier, projecting power across the Indo-Pacific's turbulent waters.

The pivot makes sense. China's navy, once confined to its coastal shallows, now roams the Indian Ocean with the confidence of a rising hegemon. Submarines slip through chokepoints, and spy ships spend a long time in India's littoral as routine. So, the Andaman Islands are the strategic outpost to compete.

At the heart of this strategy lies the Six Degree Channel, also known as the Great Channel, a 163 km-wide passage between Great Nicobar and Indonesia's Sumatra. Through it flows a quarter of global maritime trade, including 80 per cent of China's oil imports. Some 94,000 ships pass annually, making it a lifeline. For India, dominating this artery means holding a chokehold on potential adversaries. Unlike the Malacca Strait, farther east and shared with allies, the Great Channel offers New Delhi unilateral leverage—monitoring traffic in peacetime, interdicting it in

crisis. The islands' position amplifies this advantage. Stretching 800 km from Myanmar to Indonesia, they guard the entrance to the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea. China's "Malacca dilemma"—its vulnerability to blockade—becomes India's opportunity. Beijing knows this: its survey ships have probed nearby waters, and it has leased Myanmar's Coco Islands, just 55 km north, for what many suspect are listening posts. India's response? A muscular buildup to turn vulnerability into strength.

Enter the Rs 5,650-crore masterplan, a ten-year blueprint to militarise the archipelago against China's expanding footprint. Approved amid rising tensions, it aims to station more warships, aircraft, missile batteries, drones and troops. Supply lines stretch 1,200 km from the mainland, demanding self-reliance—hence the hefty price tag. But the investments span six key areas, blending naval, air and infrastructure muscle.

First, the navy is lengthening runways at INS Kohassa in Shippur, North Andamans, and INS Bazaz at Campbell Bay in the south. Both will extend to 10,000 feet, allowing heavyweight aircraft like Boeing P-8I Poseidons for anti-submarine warfare. INS Kohassa was commissioned on January 24, 2019, by then-navy chief Admiral Sunil Lanba; recent extensions underscore ongoing momentum.

Baseless doubts on Op Sindoor reveal bankruptcy of Indian politics



While some may term it as politicisation of the armed forces, the fact remains that the Indian Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, spoke from his heart on Operation Sindoor while delivering the Air Chief Marshal LM Katre Memorial Lecture in Bengaluru recently. A few days before the air chief's address, the army chief, General Upendra Dwivedi, gave his version of the operation while inaugurating 'Agnishodh', the Indian Army Research Cell at IIT Madras. Both spoke on near-similar subjects: political will, clear directions, no restrictions and major damage to Pakistan's infrastructure and assets. Their tone and tenor also conveyed that the armed forces were tired of being criticised by our own polity, which sought to play down their success, questioning conditions under which the ceasefire was imposed and sought answers to assets lost.

The frustration was evident when the air chief mentioned Balakot: 'We had intelligence of what had gone on inside, a very clear picture that there had been huge damage, that so many terrorists had been neutralised. But we could not convince our own people.' He implied that the Indian polity was the first to doubt their success in Balakot, which did impact the morale of those involved in the operations. He added that this time there was ample evidence.

On Sindoor, setting aside doubts on the downing of Pakistan aircraft, a question never raised in parliament, the air chief highlighted that India's air defence systems destroyed five Pakistani fighter jets and an AWAC/ELINT (airborne surveillance and early warning) aircraft. He added that some parked F-16s, under maintenance, were destroyed in Jacobabad, and an AWAC was destroyed at the Bholari airfield. To date almost none from the polity have acknowledged this accomplishment.

What Trump-Putin summit could mean for US-EU trans-atlantic alliance

The European countries have stood with Kyiv since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war in early 2022. For more than two years since the war, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), led by the US and the European Union, were united in supporting Ukraine in its war efforts against its more powerful neighbour. Billions of dollars of military assistance, including weapons and ammunition, flowed into Ukraine.

However, divisions within Nato as well as between the US and the European Union have become more discernible with the return of Donald Trump to the American White House. President Trump, from the days of presidential election campaigns for the second term, has repeatedly opposed his predecessor Joe Biden's Ukraine policy. He also drastically differed with Biden's approach to Nato. During his first presidency, Trump was distrustful of Nato, but his successor, Joe Biden, had restored the trans-Atlantic trust amidst the Ukraine War.

While President Trump in his second administration successfully bulldozed Nato members to agree to his proposal for enhancement of defence expenditure to make it five per cent of their respective GDP, he has not

been able to bully the EU member countries to endorse his policy towards Russia and its war against Ukraine. As President Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Alaska on Friday for their first summit this year and negotiate a deal to end the Ukraine War, European countries appear nervous. President Trump is not willing to carry the leaders of America's trans-Atlantic allies along with him while negotiating with President Putin.

During the days of the Cold War, the US always consulted, partnered and collaborated with the European allies on numerous conflict spots. The US and Nato were together in the longest war of the Cold War era in Vietnam. They were together too in the longest war of the post-Cold War era against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The US and the Nato members also fought against Russia by fully backing Ukraine militarily and seeking to cripple the Russian economy through sanctions during the Biden administration.

But now, under the Trump 2.0 administration, the trans-Atlantic relations have developed cracks, perhaps beyond complete restoration in the near future. Twenty-three out of 27 members of the European Union are also



members of the Nato alliance. President Trump considers the EU a fierce competitor, perhaps an economic rival, and recently launched a tariff war against them, as against the numerous countries around the world.

After several rounds of negotiations, the EU managed to conclude a trade deal by agreeing to a 15 per cent tariff on their exports to the US, which is actually several times more than the tariff rate earlier. The EU as an association signed the deal, the details of the deal, however, are not known. And all individual member countries are not contented over it. While many European leaders stay away from making critical remarks on President Trump's policies, the French prime minister called it a "dark day" for the deal, which was announced. Others described it as a "suboptimal deal".

While the EU energy imports from Russia were difficult amidst the Ukraine war and implementation of anti-Russian sanctions by the combined West, Trump's demands for more defence expenditure added to the economic agonies of the EU. But the European allies of the US felt more firmly sandwiched when Trump dilly-dallied on backing Ukraine militarily, pushed for direct negotiations with Russian President Putin and refused to consult them on an issue that has perceptibly posed the most serious security challenge to the continent since the end of the Second World War.

The decision of President Trump to hold a bilateral summit with President Putin in Alaska has rung an alarm bell in Europe. More outrageous to Ukraine and its European backers is the idea

of a "land swap" as part of the deal that would allow Russia to gain territory and make Ukraine cede part of its sovereign territory. Seven EU members, including France and Germany, issued a joint statement and proclaimed that "the path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine". Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenskyy, on his part, outrightly rejected any "land swap" that would be decided by the American and Russian leaders on Ukrainian territory.

It appears as if in the current situation Ukraine and some European powers are united against the United States and Russia! Its ramifications can be radical transformations in contemporary geopolitics. The trans-Atlantic alliance can develop holes that will be difficult to fill up in the foreseeable future. The divergences on political and security affairs between the United States and Europe appear stark when one considers the French and British position on Palestine, the Spanish and Swiss decision against buying F-35 fighter aircraft from the US and the European resolve to bolster their military capabilities to address security challenges in the absence of American support. France and Britain have proposed the idea

of collaboration in developing a European deterrence capability. It is understandable that there will be limits to US-Russia détente. Whether it will survive the Trump 2.0 administration is also a question mark. But the challenges of this détente between erstwhile cold warriors under the Trump administration may further erode the strategic trust between the United States and its European allies.

The EU and Britain seem to have embarked upon a journey for achieving strategic independence from the United States, and this journey is unlikely to end even after a change of administration in the US. However, the EU's desire to achieve strategic autonomy is not going to be an easy way. The EU will also face tremendous difficulties from within the association.

The recently elected president of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, for instance, is a right-wing leader who appears to be pro-Trump on certain policy matters. He is dead against Russia but opposes Nato membership for Ukraine. Yet, the efforts towards consolidating the abilities of the EU to confront the challenges emanating from the other side of the Atlantic will remain a work in progress.

Why Trump's tariffs on India are a colossal mistake

As a long-term Donald Trump supporter, it pains me to see the mistakes he is making regarding India's treatment in India. Slapping India with 50 per cent tariffs is total madness! Starting August 7, a 25 per cent levy, then another 25 per cent penalty for buying Russian oil—framed as "secondary tariffs" to squeeze Moscow and Ukraine. But this isn't smart. It's blunder that alienates a powerhouse ally, hurts America's wallet, and weakens its global clout. In short, it is a colossal mistake, and I fail to understand why he is being so hostile. India, the world's fastest-growing major economy, deserves respect—not bully tactics. Here's why Trump is wrong!

Strategically, this is a foolish decision. India is America's indispensable shield against China's aggression in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad—US, India, Japan, Australia—hinges on this bond to keep sea lanes free and Beijing in check. Trump risks shattering it. Wisser heads have called it an "enormous mistake," warning it will push New Delhi toward Moscow and Beijing after decades of US courtship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi? He's unbowed. He's prioritising India's energy security for 1.4 billion people and refusing to halt Russian imports that stabilise global prices.

Back in 2022, America encouraged India to buy Russian crude oil to cool markets post-invasion. Now? Flip-flop betrayal! This idocy accelerates India's BRICS pivot, ditching dollar dominance and eroding US leverage. India, with its booming tech hubs and

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Trump 2.0 and the end of strategic trust: Why Bharat must prepare for a long separation from America

For decades, the Bharat-United States relationship—built painstakingly across several administrations, especially in the last 25 years—has been based on a certain baseline of strategic trust. Even when disagreements arose, a bipartisan consensus in Washington recognised Delhi as an indispensable partner in not just balancing China but also stabilising the Indo-Pacific. But in Donald Trump's second term, this consensus seems to have been shattered. His foreign policy, defined by personal deal-making rather than institutional continuity, has tilted sharply toward Pakistan—driven less by geopolitical considerations and necessities than by the overlapping business interests of his family, friends, and close associates.

The clearest sign of Pakistan's growing closeness to the United States has come with two high-profile visits to Washington by Field Marshal Asim Munir in as many months. Such access is rare for an Asian military leader, rarer still for one from a country the US has long viewed through the prism of counterterrorism and aid dependency. But in Trump's presidency, Munir's military credentials are only part of the attraction; his economic utility is far more significant. The shift has opened an unambiguous American tilt toward Pakistan. And this preference, rooted in personal financial networks rather than traditional diplomacy, makes it unlikely that Trump will seek to normalise relations with Bharat anytime soon. Worse, the repercussions may very well extend beyond his presidency.

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Ph: 0261 – 221.1212, Email: shantaindustriesltd@gmail.com;
Web: shantaindustriesltd.com

EXTRACT OF AUDITED FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE QUARTER AND NINE MONTH ENDED ON JUNE 30, 2025.
(Rs. in Lakhs except FFS)

Particulars	Quarter ended on				Three Month ended on		For the Year ended on
	01/04/2025-30/06/2025	01/04/2025-31/03/2025	01/04/2024-30/06/2024	01/04/2025-30/06/2025	01/04/2024-30/06/2024	31/03/2025	
	Unaudited	Audited	Unaudited	Unaudited	Unaudited	Audited	
Total Income From Operations (net)	422.39	722.453	57.281	422.36	57.281	2024.965	
Net Profit / (Loss) for the period (before Tax, Exceptional and/or Extraordinary Items)	(3.24)	10.387	2.381	(3.239)	2.381	32.551	
Net Profit / (Loss) for the period before tax (after Exceptional and/or Extraordinary Items)	(3.24)	10.348	2.381	(3.239)	2.381	32.512	
Net Profit / (Loss) for the period after tax (after Exceptional and/or Extraordinary Items)	(3.24)	8.467	2.381	(3.239)	2.381	30.631	
Total Comprehensive Income for the period (Comprising Profit / (Loss) for the period (after tax) and Other Comprehensive Income (after tax))	(3.24)	8.467	2.381	(3.239)	2.381	30.631	
Equity Share Capital (Face value of Rs. 10 Lakh)	150	150	150	150	150	150	
Reserves (excluding Retention Reserve as shown in the audited Balance Sheet of the previous year)						616.524	
Earnings Per Share (of Rs. 10/- each) (for continuing and discontinued operations) (not annualised for quarter ended)							
Basic	(0.043)	0.564	0.159	(0.043)	0.159	2.042	
Diluted	(0.043)	0.564	0.159	(0.043)	0.159	2.042	

Note:

- The above is an extract of the detailed format of Unaudited Financial Results for the quarter and Three month ended on June 30, 2025 filed with the BSE under Regulation 33 of the SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirements Regulations, 2015). The full format of the Unaudited Financial Results for the quarter and Three month ended on June 30, 2025, is available on the website of BSE at www.bseindia.com as well as on the Company's Website at www.shantaindustriesltd.com.
- These Standalone Unaudited Financial Results have been reviewed by the Audit Committee in its meeting held on August 14, 2025 and were approved by the board of directors in their meeting held on August 14, 2025.
- The Company has evaluated its Operating segment in accordance with IND AS 108 and has concluded that it is engaged in a single operating segment.
- Figures pertaining to the previous years/period have been regrouped/rearranged, reclassified and restated wherever considered necessary, to make them comparable with those of current year/period.
- As the company do not have any Holding/Subsidiary/Joint Venture/ Associate concern, no reporting have been made in this regards.

Sd/- Harish F Sawani **Sd/-** Vasudev F Sawani **Sd/-** Shailesh J Damor
Managing Director **Whole-time director** **Chairman**
DTN: 00831848 **DTN: 00831830** **Date: 14.08.2025**
Place: Surat

